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 Tax systems continuously face new pressures and experience erosion of performance. 
 Subject to its terms of reference, the Henry review identified the main rationale for, and 
likely drivers of, further reform over the next 20 years. Its stated vision was for a tax 
system to meet the range of public policy objectives while supporting “per capita 
economic growth at the upper end of developed country experience”2. 
 Henry recommendations on tax architecture cover most of the likely long term agenda: 
o Concentrating revenue collection on four main bases (personal and business 
income, consumption, and immobile rent), and abolishing less efficient taxes; 
o Rebalancing the weights of the four main tax bases (including lower company 
tax); 
o Improving equity, efficiency and fitness-for-purpose of the general and 
retirement savings systems; and 
o Improving efficiency and equity in other taxes, transfers and charges.  
 Four additional areas not substantively addressed by Henry may also warrant reform 
attention: 
o The rate and base of the GST (replacing less efficient revenue sources); 
o Tax administration/compliance arrangements and technologies; 
o Tax avoidance and evasion (particularly inter-jurisdictional); and 
o The inter-governmental allocation of tax revenues. 
 Although ultimately dependent on political leadership and the evolution of the political-
economic context, prospects for further reform could be increased if additional 
investments are made in elements supporting the public discourse, including: 
o Demonstrating key tax reforms are a positive sum game; 
o Reframing tax choices for social spending, economic growth, and federal 
finances; 
o Strengthening understanding of tax system performance (and 
underperformance); and 
o Broadening intergenerational (sustainability) narratives. 
Background 
Since the mid-1980s, Australian tax reforms have been aimed mainly at increasing tax 
neutrality3 through base broadening and rate reductions. In addition, improved operational 
efficiency and system integrity were sought through improvements in tax legislation, 
administration and compliance. 
Reform did not bring much change in the broad tax architecture, nor tax revenues relative 
to GDP, nor systemic progressivity.  The earlier rounds related mainly to income tax 
(including superannuation arrangements) and tax administration. Introduction of the GST in 
2000 brought a measure of indirect tax reform. 
Set against the reform effort is the continuous erosion of the performance of the system. 
This results from sectional interest-based policy making, the emergence of new or 
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 Australia’s Future Tax System Report Overview (2009) p. xvii 
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 Generally neutrality is a feature of a tax system that does not change relative prices. It is thought likely as a 
result to have limited effects on both allocative efficiency and horizontal equity (although this is sometimes 
contested, and in practice a neutral tax structure may lose its neutral qualities as a result of non-neutral 
impacts on administrative/compliance costs).  
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increased avoidance and evasion opportunities, and the ongoing pressures from wider 
changes in technology, socio-economic patterns and demography. Consequently, to 
maintain performance assessed against standard axioms4, tax systems require continuous, 
or at least regular, adaptive change. However, the political difficulties associated with policy 
change have in practice meant that reform has proven a punctuated and unreliable 
process. 
The Australia’s Future Tax System (Henry Tax) Review (2009) developed the main options 
for the future broad tax and transfer system architecture, but has not yet lead to 
substantive further reform. Although relatively broad ranging (covering most taxes and 
transfers, at each level of government) the review made relatively limited contributions on a 
number of major issues, including in particular: 
 The rate and base of the GST (largely precluded by terms of reference); 
 Tax legislation, administration and compliance; 
 Tax avoidance and evasion; and  
 The intergovernmental allocation of tax revenues. 
High level goals: The Henry agenda 
The longer term rationale for further tax reform is set out in the Henry Tax Review. The case 
is built in several familiar ways:  
 Analysis of the existing tax system against standard axioms like efficiency and 
equity; 
 Analysis of changes required in response to strategic drivers (demography, 
globalising factor markets, new technologies etc); 
 Comparison with international developments in tax systems; and 
 Evidence from recent empirical work (mostly overseas), particularly suggesting how 
company taxes influence the level of economic activity or growth. 
Perhaps the main underlying goal of the Henry architecture was to facilitate the delivery of 
public policy and service objectives while maximising continued economic (and hence tax 
base) growth. The specific vision was to sustain growth in per capita incomes at the upper 
end of developed country experience.  
 The key features were to: 
 Concentrate revenue collection on four efficient tax bases - personal income 
tax, company tax, taxes on immobile rents (land and natural resources) and 
private consumption; 
 Abolish other taxes (unless they efficiently meet other specific policy goals); 
 Shift relative burdens toward less mobile bases (incl. reduced company tax 
rate to 25 per cent broadly matching movement in overseas company tax 
rates since 2000); 
 Reform the taxes on savings, both for retirement and for general savings, 
making each more neutral and fit for purpose; and 
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 The usual axioms, or principles, relate to various forms of equity and efficiency, simplicity, certainty, 
transparency and revenue adequacy. 
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 Improve efficiency and equity in other taxes, transfers and charges (in areas 
like roads, alcohol, means tests, participation incentives etc). 
Main options for medium term tax reform 
This section simply lists the main potential reform elements (with a few comments on each).  
Most of the options fit within the broad Henry tax strategy, except for the additional items 
noted previously. None of the options are easily achieved. The main list is intended to 
suggest items that might have some prospects in the next few years (say to 2020) either 
because they already have some support or may prove increasingly urgent. A second brief 
list of even more difficult, perhaps longer term, items is provided subsequently. These tend 
to be items that have long been identified as meeting economic reform criteria but which 
have equally long proven too difficult for the political system to digest. 
Company tax rate reduction 
 Thirty per cent rate now well above simple average of OECD countries and most 
Asian countries 
 UK, Denmark and others continuing to reduce rates (towards 22 per cent); 
 Main impact may be in reduced profit shifting:  case also relating to investment 
margins 
 Full benefits from reduced effective tax rate as well as statutory rate reduction. 
However, if equity returns in Australia mainly constitute rent, case is weakened 
relative to Europe/Asia 
 Constraints (a) initial revenue cost and (b) company tax serves multiple roles (rent 
tax, personal tax integrity etc) 
Unit value land taxation 
 Henry proposed tax rate on all land linked to unit (per square meter) value 
 Main efficiency gains arising at three behavioural margins (a) reducing/eliminating 
exemptions based on land use (b) eliminating tax rate variations based on 
aggregation of holdings  and (c) eliminating change of ownership taxes (stamp 
duties) 
 Constraints (a) transitional land value effects (b) state/local tax base sharing   
Replacement of inefficient state taxes/increased rate and base of the GST/simplified 
personal tax system and rate scale  
 These three would best be packaged because of price and disposable income 
effects  
 Gains in neutrality, transparency, technical efficiency 
 Probably not possible until net tax cuts are feasible (if ever) due to bracket creep 
 Wide range of possible scale/scope choices: small scale steps may be possible 
such as abolition of insurance taxes (relatively low revenue); steps already taken 
towards rate simplification etc 
 Constraints (a) political winners/losers (b) intergovernmental finances (c) base 




Longevity and aged care risk solutions in retirement incomes policy 
 Highest long run priority due to strength and costs of the “late aging” trends 
 Two elements: one is to reduce fiscal subsidies for early retirement and the other is 
to increase relative incentives for insuring longevity and aged care risks  
 This part of the Henry retirement story has had some recent late converts, however 
there remains no clear consensus on the best way to address the issues 
International tax base erosion and profit shifting  
 New technologies (digitisation, low cost communications) threaten both direct and 
indirect tax bases, with the likelihood that this has much further to go. 
 Long established jurisdictional tax concepts do not work well (or at all) in this 
context 
  OECD and G20 etc processes to address problems face the problem that 
incentives differ for countries with differing intellectual property strengths. Tax 
treaties all bilateral and so unwieldy: create a complex maze for tax-responsive  
income/expense  flows to negotiate 
 
The intergovernmental allocation of tax revenues  
 Little understood, except as an opportunity for political posturing, arguably 
worsening  
 Cannot be properly resolved without a clear vision for a 21st century federation. 
 
Examples of less likely, perhaps longer term, reforms 
Many of the items listed above are politically very difficult. Yet there is a considerable list of 
further measures that would have (generally on orthodox analysis) potentially meaningful 
economic efficiency and often equity benefits that are nonetheless politically even more 
remote possibilities. Some have never been able to get onto agendas. Others have been 
tried and failed, making second efforts more difficult. A few present some difficulties in 
assessing net benefits.  
 Taxes on wealth transfers (estate or inheritance taxes) 
 Replacing mineral royalties with rent based taxes (round two) 
 Conversion of some or all of the company income tax to a rent based tax 
(allowances for corporate equity or expensing, or at least more rapid capital 
expenditure (capex) write-off) 
 Henry-type more neutral taxation of savings: perhaps further extended  through: 
 Replacement of dividend imputation with a low flat rate dividend tax; 
 Abolition of negative gearing (or with similar effect replacement of income tax 




 More radical new tax options to address the problems for international taxation 
resulting from new technologies, e.g. unitary taxation, multi-lateral treaties, financial 
service taxes; 
 Full or partial road use pricing using modern vehicle use tracking technologies;  
 Integration (or greater alignment) of the tax and transfer systems and their 
administration; 
 Simplified return-free personal tax system;   
 Neutral secondary indirect taxes on alcohol, fuels, gambling etc; 
 Henry-type reform of the taxation of the accumulation stage for superannuation5;  
 Cash flow value added taxation to replace existing invoice-based systems; and 
 Rewrite of the tax laws (if a preferred form can be agreed). 
 
Prospects for tax reform 
Reform Packages  
It is not uncommon to find a reasonable level of support for the general long term goals or 
ideas of tax reform. It is much less common to find strong enough support for actually 
making the policy changes directed towards them. 
In political practice, tax reform is often best approached through one or more packages, 
although this is not a guarantee of success. Packages deal not only with specific reform 
elements but also with their interactions, trade-offs and timing. It is notable that some 
attempts at packages have not proven sustainable in recent times in the face of other 
political priorities. Policy packaging was not attempted as part of the Henry review (though 
some have wrongly assumed the entire report was an intended package). 
This note also does not attempt to define possible packages. However, one issue may 
deserve some further consideration. It may be desirable to attempt to separate packages 
relating to capital taxes from those relating to personal and indirect taxes. The former needs 
to be understood mainly through an economic growth perspective, while the latter as a 
political choice through a consumption allocation/distribution perspective. The latter may 
usefully be linked also with the policies for government funded transfers and collective 
household consumption – if these are unavoidably to rise in future, tax mechanisms for 
higher revenues should aim at households and consumption (rather than taxes on saving 
and investment).   
Short term constraints 
The shorter term context often operates against tax reform. In recent times a key problem 
has been the re-emergence of fiscal balance concerns at all levels of government, due 
largely to a fall in the revenue robustness of key taxes. Annual tax collections have fallen by 
about two percentage points of GDP with the result that large tax cuts cannot be offered as 
part of reform packages. The fall in tax collections has several causes but particularly 
followed (a) large personal tax cuts announced in economic boom conditions prior to the 
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 Flat rate of concessions, neutral treatment of all forms of contribution under annual cap, single regime for 
earnings tax etc 
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GFC and (b) the fiscal impact on Australia of the five years of global financial/fiscal crisis 
through reduced prices and activity in asset markets, with consequent impacts on several 
asset related tax bases. 
Coupled with the broader fiscal situation and the shared political aspiration to restore 
budget surpluses of up to one percentage point of GDP, the loss of revenue means that it 
will take several more years of financial recovery and further bracket creep (non-indexation 
of the rate scales) before a nominal tax cut can be included in any future tax reform 
package. The device of including the return of bracket creep revenue increases as part of 
tax reform package calculations was a key element in reforms of the 1980s and 2000. 
Other short term political priorities that are often pointed to as explaining the current lack of 
appetite for tax reform, however, are probably long term issues presenting in short term 
guise.  These include: 
 Carbon pricing and its likely replacement with policy alternatives, as part of a 
broader set of issues relating to taxes, energy and infrastructure 
 Pressures and changing priorities in relation to social and education spending  
 Deepening distrust and political contest between the levels of government 
While the current manifestations of issues like these are taking political attention, to the 
apparent exclusion of other structural reform agendas like tax reform, they will not prove to 
be short term constraints on structural reform. On the contrary, they will need to be 
harnessed in time as part of the case for, and the fabric of, tax reform itself. 
Influencing reform prospects  
For the moment, there is little to suggest that strong support is now building, let alone a 
consensus forming, for further tax reform in Australia. The constraints are many (fiscal, 
political, economic, historical etc) but they may not differ greatly in scale from those that 
always exist in one form or another. Creating the possibility for substantive public reform 
usually requires the prior alignment of several key factors, and then since these are never 
fully in place, a bit of political leadership to press over the line. An organisation like CEDA 
can influence prospects by contributing towards the alignment of the supportive factors, 
which may include (for example):  
 Demonstrating (preferably empirically) that further tax reform is a positive sum 
game.  
o This might be facilitated by the existence of an independent, trusted and 
credible tax research institute using with its own modelling to demonstrate 
options. The government has announced funding for this on a number of 
occasions but not implemented it. 
 Build the dual tax system mindset (more closely linking choices about social 
spending with labour/consumption taxes and choices about growth, infrastructure 
and investment with capital taxation).  If this is not done, all tax reform will continue 
to be hostage to simple, short term winner-loser assessments.    
  Annual report cards from Government on the performance of key elements of the 
existing tax system (such as the business tax system, indirect taxes etc) including 
the impacts of changing technology.   
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 Linking tax to the reform of inter-governmental financial relations. There is growing 
dissatisfaction about the federal compact and its apparent duplication and 
entanglement of responsibilities. At the same time there is a strong case for the 
subsidiarity principle to apply in the face of complicated and complex social needs. 
It seems unlikely that this can be resolved unless revenue is part of the equation, 
and equally the efficiency problems of the current state tax bases cannot be 
resolved without federal financial reform.  
 Strengthening the inter-generational (sustainability) narrative, and its outreach to a 
wider cross section of the community. Although the intergenerational reports have 
made some progress in changing community expectations, they have continued to 
be narrowly focused with gaps in areas like state spending, the future costs of 
superannuation etc and have not been adequately linked to policy variables like the 
NDIS and education reform.  
 
 
